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One of the most interesting cases of the third wave of democratization around the world is that of 
South Africa in 1994. We have a great magnitude of literature on the South African regime change. 
Most studies focus on the power struggle between the African National Congress (ANC) and the then 
governing National Party (NP) or between the Blacks and the Whites or on the type of democratic 
institutions to be adopted in the post-transitional period. Yet, few have addressed the issue of why the 
largest black ethnic group of Zulus played a “spoiler” during the transition to democracy. This study 
deals with the issue of why many Zulus, represented by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), collaborated 
with the Whites to wage bloody struggles against other Black “brothers,” although they themselves 
had belonged to the repressed in the system of apartheid. This study begins with an introduction to the 
Zulu ethnic group and its nationalism in order to provide preliminary information about who the Zulus 
are. This is followed by our explanation for why they were engaged in violent conflicts with the other 
Blacks.  
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One of the most interesting cases of the third wave of democratization around the world 
is that of South Africa in 1994. We have a great magnitude of literature on the South African 
regime change. Most studies focus on the power struggle between the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the then governing National Party (NP) or between Blacks and  Whites 
or on the type of democratic institutions to be adopted in the post-transition period (Jung and 
Shapiro 1995; Friedman 1995; Horowitz 1985 and 1991; Shugart and Carey 1992; Lijphart 
1985; Steytler and Mettler 2001; Pottie 2001).1 Yet, few have addressed the issue of why the 
largest black ethnic group of Zulus played a “spoiler” during the transition to democracy.2  
                                                          
1 For a brief introduction to history and politics including political parties in South Africa, see Banks, 
Muller, and Overstreet (2007). The ANC was the leading opposition party against the NP’s apartheid 
system, that is, the South African style of racial segregation policy. Its prominent leaders include 
Nobel laureate Nelson Mandela. The White-dominant National Party was the government party under 
the old regime, and it was later renamed the New National Party in 1998. It has increasingly lost its 
political influence after the democratic transition, giving way to the Democratic Party or Alliance, a 
parliamentary opposition during the old-regime period. The IFP is an ethnic party that promotes the 
interests of Zulus, the largest ethnic group in South Africa. It turned out to be the third largest party in 
the country in all three post-transitional elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004. 
2 Notable exceptions are Auvinen and Kivimaki (2001) and Chipkin (2004). Auvinen and Kivimaki 
tend to emphasize the perceptual differences about the system of apartheid among the ethnic Zulus as 
well as economic deprivation and rapid urbanization. Meanwhile, Chipkin focuses on the rise of a 
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This study deals with the issue of why many Zulus, represented by the Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP), collaborated with the Whites to wage bloody struggles against other Black 
“brothers,” although they themselves belonged to the repressed under the system of 
apartheid.3  
This study begins with an introduction to the Zulu ethnic group and its nationalism in 
order to provide preliminary information about who the Zulus are. This is followed by our 
explanation for why they were engaged in violent conflicts with the other Blacks. Political 
violence by the Zulus during the 1994 transition to democracy might not be explained by a 
single variable; rather, it might be attributed to a variety of variables. The violence might be 
due to devastating economic conditions that destabilized the life of the Zulu masses, or to a 
psychological crisis of self-identity in the wake of modernization and social mobilization that 
led the masses to seek a sense of identity from an ethnic or national community. The 
violence might also have its origin in the past or history; thus, it might be viewed as a 
prolonged expression of intractable antagonism between the Zulus and their historical enemy, 
often implied in news journals. In this study, however, we argue that the Zulu violence was 
motivated largely by political factors such as the political elite’s expected total exclusion 
from post-transitional politics under majority rule. We finally conclude with a brief summary. 
 
 
2. WHO THE ZULUS ARE: HISTORY AND LANGUAGE 
 
The word, Zulu, corresponds to the English word, blue or blue sky. Thus, the Zulu people 
literally means the people of the sky. More meaningfully, it referred originally to the Zulu 
clan. The origin of the Zulu clan, in turn, goes back “to about 1670, to an old man who lived 
a nomadic life in the Babanango area of Natal’s northern midlands (Elliott 1978: 14-15).” 
His name was Malandela, and the younger of his two sons was called Zulu. Yet, he has little 
historical meaning for today’s Zulus except having left his name. Of more significance is one 
of his descendants, who was born about 1787 and founded the first Zulu kingdom. His name 
was Shaka or Chaka. Zulu nationalism today claims that he was the founder of the Zulu 
nation. It attempts to construct Zulu national identity based on the historical facts, myths, or 
fictions concerning Shaka.4 
However, the claim of Zulu nationalism that the Zulu nation was established as early as 
the 1820s seems untenable. History of Shaka’s kingdom was that of the so-called Mfecane, 
or bloody conquest.5 This bloody history is unlikely to have successfully instilled a sense of 
community in the clans brutally conquered by him. Furthermore, as early as 1879, history of 
the Zulu kingdom as a sovereign state ended with the military defeat of Shaka’s nephew, 
Cetshwayo, and the consequent disintegration of his kingdom into thirteen separate 
                                                          
new style of nationalistic labor unionism, which advocated the idea of national democratic revolution 
and antagonized tribalism or the traditional value system of Zulus. 
3 For more about political violence in South Africa, see, among others, Adam and Moodley (1992) and 
Benini (1998). For the post-transitional political developments in South Africa, see Garcia-Rivero 
(2006) and Southall (2000). 
4 For a critical review of Zulu nationalism, see Golan (1994). 
5 The term, Mfecane, literally means “crushing.” Shaka was infamous for his ruthless rule and bloody 
conquest. During the Mfecane, millions of people were slaughtered. An old story says that he killed 
those who did not cry loud enough when his mother died (Economist 31 December, 1999: 70). 
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territories. This means the independent Zulu kingdom lasted only for about 60 years. This 
period does not appear to be long enough for the independent Zulu kingdom to build a strong 
sense of national identity. It is true that at the moment of the British invasion into Zululand 
in 1879, there was a population identified as Zulu by the British, but it is still uncertain 
whether the Zulus identified themselves as a separate ethnic group.6 In other words, it is not 
clear whether the Zulus who had inflicted the greatest disaster on the British army since the 
Crimean War entertained a distinct ethnic (or national) identity or remained simply members 
of a political entity called the Zulu kingdom. Nonetheless, Zulu nationalism today clearly 
prefers to view the Zulus at that time as constituting a nation founded on an ethnic identity of 
its own.  
Today the term, “Zulus,” sometimes means those who speak the Zulu language at home. 
The Zulu-speaking people are one of the three sub-divisions of the Nguni-speaking people; 
the other two are the Xhosas and the Swazis. The Nguni-speaking people, in turn, are distinct 
from the other three or four groups: the Kwesan, the Sotho, the Venda, and the Tsonga 
(Keyter 1991: 21-22).7 
Despite the existence of striking differences between the Xhosa and Zulu languages, they 
are still mutually understandable. The Zulu language is one of the dialects of the Nguni 
language, implying that the linguistic distinction between the Xhosa and Zulu peoples is not 
fundamental. In terms of purely linguistic distance alone, more salient is the distance 
between the Nguni and Sotho languages than that between the Zulu and Xhosa languages. 
Nonetheless, the political division between the Xhosas and the Zulus is, in fact, more salient 
in South Africa than that between the Nguni and the Sotho. This is in part due to the 
politicization by Inkatha of the linguistically closer distance between the Zulus and the 
Xhosas, on the one hand, and the de-politicization by the ANC of the much longer distance 
between the Nguni and other Black populations, on the other.8 
  
 
3. THE FEATURES OF ZULU NATIONALISM 
 
To better understand the Zulus, we also need to explore the role of an image-maker or 
history-interpreter in addition to their shared history and language.9 In the case of the Zulus, 
this role has been played by Zulu nationalists who first formed a cultural movement 
organization, the Inkatha yeNkululenko yeSizwe and later turned this into a political party, 
the Inkatha Freedom Party. The choice of the word, Inkatha, in naming the movement is 
                                                          
6 This issue is not clear even in a classic on South American history, Wilson and Thompson (1971: 
261-267). Some more recent studies, including Golan (1994) and Piper (2002), tend to question the 
historical presence of the Zulus as a nation. 
7 The Kwensan in turn divide into two separate subdivisions: the Bushmen and the Khwe-Khwen. They 
are in a true sense aboriginals in South Africa. The Bushmen today have almost disappeared, and the 
Khwe-Khwen have been assimilated by the colored population such that there are no pure members of 
the Khwe-Khwen. 
8 In a similar way, we can understand the fact that the Hindus in the Punjab reacted to the demand for 
Punjabi Suba by disowning the Punjabi language, their mother tongue. Their disowning of the mother 
tongue was done for political reasons. See Nayar (1966: 44-50). 
9 For detailed discussion about overall difficulties inherent in objective identification of nation, see 
Deutsch (1966, chapter 1). 
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highly symbolic. “It refers to the thick coil or ring, made up of the many strands of grass that 
represent the unity of the Zulu people in their circle of loyalty to their king. But an inkatha is 
also a grass ring or coil placed on the head as a pad when carrying a weight. Thus, it carries a 
double meaning: it is both a sacred emblem of Zulu unity and a support when under stress 
(Harries 1993: 114-115).” Inkatha’s interpretation of Zulu identity has rarely encountered a 
serious challenge because there were few other competing Zulu organizations. Hence, this 
study will see the features of Zulu nationalism expressed in the Inkatha movement. 
 
3.1 A Strong Consciousness of History 
 
First of all, like any other nationalism, Zulu nationalism is characterized by a strong 
consciousness of history. Inkatha has attempted to make the best of Zulu history since the 
rise of Shaka, especially, the period of the independent Zulu kingdom, in order to build a 
strong Zulu identity. The notion of history occupies the central position of the ideology. This 
is clearly shown in Chief Buthelezi’s speech on Shaka Day in 1988: “Zulu were a product of 
history . . . and history has ‘prepared a place for us’; history is ‘guiding us’ to a destiny 
(Mare 1993: 65).” Buthelezi often draws parallels between past and present. For example, “a 
proposed ANC march on the Kwazulu capital is likened to the British invasion of 
Cetshwayo’s kingdom (Harries 1993: 112).” 
In passing, it is notable that the Zulu history Buthelezi speaks of is not objective but 
deliberately selective and invented. Some historical events were intentionally dismissed. For 
example, he keeps silent about the fact that his great grandfather “deserted the young king 
Dinuzulu when the British annexed Zululand in 1887 (Harries 1993: 112; see also Mare 
1993: 99).” Some events were even created from nothing. For example, the battle of Qokli 
Hill which is often quoted to show that Shaka was cunningly tactical was invented by E.A. 
Litter, who was responsible for the shift of Shaka’s image from monster to hero (Wylie 
1994: 11). In fact, it is not history that provides Buthelezi a guide to the present; it is rather 
his conception of the present political situation that gives him  direction on how to view the 
past. 
 
3.2 King as the Nation  
 
In addition to the preceding universal characteristic, Zulu nationalism has its own 
peculiar features. Above all, it is a highly king-centered ideology. This nature of Zulu 
nationalism is found in King Goodwill’s words, “I am the nation (Mare 1993: 68)” or in 
Buthelezi’s words, “His Majesty [sums up] Zulu history in his person (Mare 1993: 97).” 
Zulu nationalism attempted to restore the declining authority of King Goodwill. As a 
result of Inkatha’s attempts to strengthen his authority, the king had three palaces and many 
other trappings of his traditional position in the late 1980s. Zulu nationalism also embellishes 
the very undemocratic past of the Zulu kingdom. The most important historical symbol of the 
Zulu nation is King Shaka, the founder of the Zulu kingdom. He, as a despot, determined, 
among other things, whether and when his young subjects could get married. Despite his 
despotism, the idolization of Shaka constitutes a central part of Zulu nationalism. According 
to Buthelezi, King Shaka “already saw the new South Africa as inevitable even while he was 
putting the Zulu kingdom together. Before he died, he had visions of aeroplanes flying in the 
air carrying the people . . . (Mare 1993: 66).” 
The efforts to refurbish the authority of King Goodwill, nonetheless, were not intended to 
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confer substantial political power on him as King Shaka exercised in his lifetime. Chief 
Buthelezi wanted King Goodwill to remain as just a symbolic figure of the Zulu nation while 
preferring to put substantial power under his own control. That is, Buthelezi wanted a clear-
cut division of labor between king and prime minister. He made sure that “Zulus love their 
king and it is unthinkable that he should be given executive functions which mean inevitable 
involvement in politics . . . . [sic] which would tarnish the royal kingdom (Marks 1986: 117). 
This idea of the division of labor was not supported by history of the Zulu kingdom in which 
Zulu kings including Shaka exercised a tremendous amount of substantial power. This fact 
made the division of labor unstable; in fact, Zulu kings sometimes made unsuccessful 
attempts to regain their past substantial power.10 
 
3.3 Heredity-based Political Legitimacy   
 
Inkatha has not only tried to restore an old order by refurbishing the declining authority 
of the Zulu royal family but also made strenuous efforts to seek political legitimacy from 
heredity rule. Hereditary legitimacy basically means that rulers are legitimized to rule their 
people simply because they have so far done so; thus, their political legitimacy is unlikely to 
rely on their governmental performance or on what their people think of them.  
In Zulu nationalism, the idea of hereditary legitimacy is extended not just to determining 
who is a legitimate king, but also to determining who is a legitimate prime minister. Chief 
(or Prime Minister) Buthelezi defended his position to say that he was entitled to his position 
because his ancestors held the same position in the past. His dead ancestors, not the living 
masses, entitled him to be prime minister. In his own words, 
 
I am a great grandson of King Cetschwayo who fought the whites for independence of the 
land and his people. King Cetschwayo was a nephew of King Shaka who founded the Zulu 
nation . . . . I am a grandson of King Dinuzulu. I am a hereditary chief of the Buthelezi tribe, 
the great grandson of Mnyamana Buthelezi who was Prime Minister to the Zulu nation when 
we were still a sovereign nation. My great grandfather was commander-in-chief of the entire 
Zulu army. My father was Prime Minister to King Solomon . . . . I was Prime Minister to King 
Cyprian, who was my first cousin (Harries: 1993: 113).  
 
It is also true that Buthelezi’s claim for hereditary legitimacy resonated with a large 
number of Zulus. This fact is explained largely by traditionalism prevalent in Zulu society, 




Zulu nationalism has attempted to maintain a traditional political order that gets more and 
more discredited among the masses, and, in particular, young university students (Marks 
1986, chapter 1). For example, Buthelezi referred to traditional chiefs as “the pillars on 
which the Zulu nation stands (Mare 1993: 68).” He also clearly said, “We will preserve the 
                                                          
10  For the power struggle between King Zwelithini and Chief Buthelezi, see “Annual Reference 
Supplement,” Keesing’s Record of World Events 41 (1995: R31). 
11 For a recent study of the traditional institution of chieftaincy in KwaZulu-Natal after the democratic 
transition, see Beall, Mkhize, and Vawda (2005).  
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traditional system of Chieftainship in Kwazulu (Mare 1993: 68).” The traditionalism 
alienates the reform-minded younger generation, especially, university students, and most 
labor unions from the Inkatha movement. Conversely, Inkatha supporters typically “in rural 
communities and migrant hostels deeply resent the political crusades of urban-based youths 
who were challenging a traditional order in which children ‘obeyed,’ and left politics to, their 
elders (Adam and Moodley 1992: 503-504).” 
The following paragraph, even if a little out-of-date, provides us with some clue to the 
issue of why strong traditionalism still survives in the Zulu region. 
 
The discovery of diamonds in the southern African interior in the late 1860s had brought 
the first stirring of economic revolution to most communities between the Cape and the 
Zambezi. One of its effects was to attract to the mines Africans from all parts of the sub-
continent. The Zulu, however, seem to have been an exception to this. There was as yet no need 
for them to labor outside their territory for cash or firearms because the expanding forces of 
colonialism had not penetrated the structure of the Zulu social formation. While other African 
communities [including the Xhosas] had been forcibly driven from their land, or had lost their 
self-sufficiency as their surplus products and labour were drawn beyond their borders, the Zulu 
remained in possession of their land, and their labour was still expended within the kingdom 
(Guy 1979: 3). 
 
Of course, the later destruction of the Zulu kingdom by the British invasion forcibly 
incorporated the Zulus into the modern economy. Yet, the Zulu area was colonized much 
later than other contemporary South African areas. It remained independent while most other 
areas had already been occupied by colonialists. As a result, its history of exposition to 
modern Western society is relatively short. 
In addition to its short and brief history of Westernization or cultural colonization by the 
West, the low level of modernization or economic development in the Zulu area allows its 
residents to sustain much of their traditional way of life, including their uncritical political 
attitudes toward their traditional rulers.12 The Zulu area is one of the most underdeveloped 
areas in South Africa. The regions of Kwazulu and Natal, where most of the Zulus live, are 
relatively poor in South Africa. Much worse, within the region, Kwazulu, the Zulu homeland, 
is much poorer than Natal. “Annual per-capita income in Kwazulu in 1980 was under [R] 
200; of this only R 45 came from domestic production (Marks 1986: 114).” “[T]oday the 
vast majority of the inhabitants of Kwazulu are dependent on the earnings of migrants and 
commuters to the ‘white economy’ for subsistence. Yet, 80 percent of these earnings are 
spent in the area of the ‘white economy.’ Kwazulu is a land of ‘women without men,’ as 
each year about the two-thirds of the able-bodied men seek work at the mines, farms and 
factories of white South Africa (Marks 1986: 114-115).” In some areas, “the absentee rate of 
men between the ages of twenty and forty-five is 80 percent, while 50 percent of the 
population is under the age of fifteen (Marks 1986: 115).”13 In sum, the homeland of the 
Zulus is fairly underdeveloped, and as a result, their traditional way of life in Kwazulu 
remains by and large uninterrupted. Even the Zulu migrants, living outside their homeland, 
have not uprooted themselves from their traditions. Their urban income is too small for them 
                                                          
12 Their political attitudes are characterized by lack of self-consciousness as independent political 
decision-makers. This feature may be succinctly expressed as follows: Leave politics to leaders. 
13 Also see Schlemmer and Muil (1975: 107-120). 
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to bring their families to the city. Instead, they send back their earnings to their families left 
behind them. Moreover, they periodically return to their families. The Zulu migrants have 
not broken their ties with their home villages permanently. As a result, the so-called social 




The last feature of Zulu nationalism lies in its emphasis on history of war and conquest or 
in its image-making of Zulus as indomitable warriors. Zulu nationalism characterizes the 
Zulus as brothers born of warrior stock. It takes very great pride in King Shaka’s ruthless 
conquest of neighboring clans, which is said to have victimized more than one million people. 
In line with this emphasis on the warrior tradition, Buthelezi announced a program of 
restoring no fewer than 74 historic battlefields (Mare 1993: 79). Consequently, Zuluness is 
characterized by such virtues as valor and wisdom required to conquer, incorporate, and if 
necessary, eliminate the enemy. The Zulus are told by Buthelezi to “have a duty to flush out 
anything that in any way undermines the unity and solidarity of our people (Mare 1993: 70).” 
Zulu nationalism not only allows political activists to employ violence as a means of 
overcoming their political obstacles, but also legitimizes violent political actions in the name 
of the Zulu nation. However, a full understanding of the violent nature of Zulu nationalism is 
only possible when we recognize that the emphasis of Zulu nationalism on violent history 
reflects the way Zulu elites perceive and evaluate their present political circumstances. In 
other words, the violent nature of Zulu nationalism which puts heavy emphasis on war and 
conquest in the past is to be explained by understanding the political circumstances that 
confront Zulu elites as a nation-builder in the present. 
 
 
4. EXPLANATIONS FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE BY THE ZULUS 
 
4.1 Alternative Explanations for Zulu Violence 
 
Political violence exercised by the Zulus during the 1994 transition to democracy in 
South Africa might not be explained by a single variable; rather, it might be attributed to a 
variety of variables. The violence might be due to devastating economic conditions that 
destabilized the life of the masses, or to a psychological crisis of self-identity in the wake of 
modernization and social mobilization that led the masses to seek a sense of identity from an 
ethnic or national community. The violence might also originate in the past or history; thus, 
it might be viewed as a prolonged expression of intractable antagonism between the Zulus 
and their historical enemy, Xhosas, as is often implied in news journals.  
It is true that the aforementioned poor economic conditions of the Zulus were in part 
responsible for their violent actions. The destabilizing effect of the devastated economy 
accounted, in particular, for why the masses were so easily mobilized by Zulu elites for 
political purposes. “Indeed, the main participants and victims of the 1990-94 political 
violence were hostel dwellers and squatters who . . . were most severely exploited and 
disadvantaged by the apartheid system (Auvinen and Kivimaki 2001: 77).” 
However, it is difficult to explain the intensive violence by the Zulus during the transition 
                                                          
14 For the idea of social mobilization, see Deutsch (1966). 
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to democracy by past antagonism between the Zulus and other ethnic groups in South Africa. 
The reason is that it was the Whites who waged the biggest war against the Zulus in their 
history and, at the same time, disintegrated the independent Zulu kingdom. Only the Whites 
could be really to blame for having destroyed the emerging Zulu nation in the past and for 
having incurably impaired the Zulus’ pride in their indomitable history; the other Black 
ethnic groups were rather a victim of the Zulus’ historical violence and conquest. Thus, from 
a historical point of view, the Zulus should have directed the most violent antagonism 
towards the Whites, not towards the other Black groups. However, the targets of Zulu 
violence during the democratic transition were very rarely Whites.  
A psychological explanation for Zulu violence is unsatisfactory too. 15  Adam and 
Moodley point out a psychological condition of the masses among other explanatory 
variables by saying that “The [Zulu] migrants at the bottom of the social hierarchy, not 
surprisingly, find solace from their material and symbolic deprivation in their identification 
with a mystical Zulu pride and fighting spirit (Adam and Moodley 1992: 505).”16 This 
psychological explanation, however, does not explain either the actual cycle of the Zulu 
violence during the transition, i.e., why most cases of significant Zulu violence took place 
during the early and concluding stages of regime transition or the pattern of the violence, i.e., 
why the Zulus directed their violence at the other Black groups even with the help of the 
Whites. Furthermore, the loss of self-identity due to the uprooting from their traditional 
communities in the wake of industrialization and urbanization might lead the Zulus to 
subscribe to nationalism or any other kind of communalism with which they could identify 
themselves with, but it could not explain why they exercised violence at all to express their 
identity.  
A better explanation for the Zulu violence in South Africa towards the other Black groups 
with the assistance of the Whites is that both the White government and the Zulu Black 
leadership were driven by some common interest to confront the ANC as an enemy. Their 
common threat laid in the political arena, namely, the ANC’s preferred program for post-
transition politics, i.e., establishment of simple and pure majority rule without regional 
autonomy. 
 
4.2 Political Explanation for Zulu Violence: Permanent Exclusion of Zulu Elites  
from Power under Majority Rule 
 
Simple and pure majority rule, as opposed to what is called consensual democracy or 
super-majority rule, does not often provide a solution to deep-rooted political conflict based 
on ascriptive cleavages such as racial, ethnic and regional divisions. This is especially true 
when one of the ascriptively divided forces is numerically dominant over other forces. In this 
case, democracy as simple majority rule merely means the permanent monopoly of power by 
a numerically dominant force and the consequent exclusion of minorities from power on a 
permanent basis, as long as the ascriptive divisions remain immutable. A working model of 
democracy can be established when majority rule is more or less temporary or when a next 
majority group is not always predetermined before an election.17 
                                                          
15 For a typical psychological explanation, see Horowitz (1985, chapter 4). 
16 The more recent explanations with reference to the ideological or perceptual differences in note 2 
may be also categorized into this type of psychological explanation. 
17 For the idea that democracy means temporary majority rule, see Rustow (1967: 227-236). For some 
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Among other obstacles to the formation of temporary majorities, ethnic cleavage is 
prominent. Whenever ethnic cleavage is dominant over relatively temporary cleavages, such 
as socioeconomic one, a particular political force’s electoral constituency is more or less 
fixed. Its political influence is limited to a certain constituency in every election. Of course, 
even in a working model of democracy, few political forces are really popular across every 
cleavage. Thus, a certain political force’s popularity is always limited whether the main 
cleavages are ascriptive or non-ascriptive. But in the case of ascriptive cleavages, there is a 
very low mobility of membership across cleavages; even such limited mobility, if ever, 
occurs over a very long term.  In contrast, in a society characterized by non-ascriptive 
cleavages, there is a higher degree of expected mobility across cleavages over a relatively 
short term. As a result, in an ascriptive society, there are few floating votes for which 
political forces can compete, in contrast to a non-ascriptive society. A significant political 
implication of this fact is that any political force whose electoral constituency consists of an 
ethnic minority should take the great risk of being excluded from power on a permanent 
basis unless the political force successfully blocks the introduction of simple majority 
democracy in every possible way including violence. 
Under the South African system of apartheid, Zulu political elites exercised limited 
autonomy in Kwazulu, one of the ten Black homelands. They were rulers, as long as they 
chose to remain as a part of the system. However, an ANC-led transition to democracy 
threatened this limited autonomy of Zulu political elites in two respects. First, Zulu political 
elites had so far sought their main political legitimacy through tradition and heredity rather 
than through their governmental performance and electoral support. A newly established 
democratic regime of any kind threatened the hereditary legitimacy, and it was expected to 
leave Zulu elites little room for resorting to such legitimacy.  
Second, a particular form of democracy preferred by the expected governing force, the 
ANC, was based on uncompromised simple majority rule without regional autonomy. This 
had several implications for the Zulu ruling class. One implication was that the Zulu 
kingdom was to be abolished or at least significantly weakened. However, as mentioned 
above, Zulu nationalists behaved as if there would be no Zulu nation without a Zulu kingdom.  
A more important and comprehensive implication was that such a regime would exclude 
Zulu nationalists permanently from the new central and regional governments. First, Inkatha 
did not have confidence in electoral victory in a new system of representation through free 
competition in its homeland, even though it claimed over 750,000 dues-paying members 
(Kitchen 1988: 43). Second, should it win t all of the Zulu votes, this sum would constitute 
only a small minority in South Africa’s whole electoral constituency, even though the Zulus 
were the single largest ethnic group.18  The reason was that not ethnic identity but the 
democratic/antidemocratic line was expected to prevail in post-apartheid elections in the 
majority of South African areas. If ethnicity had been the most important variable in political 
decisions of the non-Zulu Blacks as well as of the Zulus, the South African Black electorate 
would have divided into so many contending ethnic forces. In this hypothetical situation of 
complete ethnic division, the Zulu-based IFP would have turned out to be the largest political 
                                                          
other discussion on majoritarian democracy and ethnic competition, see Horowitz (1985: 86 and 360-
362). 
18 For the approximate composition of the South African population, see Selby (1973: 267). The 
precise statistic is not available since the White government excluded the Blacks in the so-called 
homelands from population censuses. 
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force in South Africa because the Zulus were the single largest ethnic group.  However, this 
was not the case; the non-Zulu Black groups were not politically divided along ethnic lines. 
Violent actions by Zulu activists during the transition were due largely to the expected 
high risk of permanent exclusion from central and regional power in case that a unitary 
system of simple majority rule should be adopted. Since the primary goal of Zulu nationalists 
was to prevent the possibility of falling into a permanently governed minority force, they 
were willing to share a common political interest with the Whites who also worried about the 
similar possibility after a regime transition took place. Thus, Zulu nationalists collaborated in 
one or another way with the Whites in the face of their common political enemy, the ANC 
and its allies. 
At first, the Apartheid government denied the offering of any kind of aid to Inkatha’s 
political actions. What was symbolically called “Inkathagate” revealed that it had lied 
(Maclean’s August 12, 1981: 21; Time August 12, 1991: 43; Time July 29, 1991: 41). Based 
on the above-mentioned common interest between the Zulus and the Whites, some forces 
within the Apartheid government that was out of President de Klerk’s control helped Inkatha 
in several ways. The collaboration of the regime forces with Inkatha was described in the 
following report: 
 
The following is a typical scenario of incidents in which police fail to intervene in Inkatha 
attacks. The scenario is based on a composite of numerous actual reports: 1) A rumor spreads 
of an impending Inkatha attack; 2) Police are notified but are slow to respond; 3) Residents 
[who are usually ANC supporters] take matters into their own hands and erect barricades; 4) 
Police appear on the scene and remove barricades and/or disperse residents; 5) The attack 
ensues; 6) Police do not intervene and in some cases participate in either attacks or looting (The 
Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 1992: 78; brackets in original). 
 
The fact that much of the Zulu violence was manipulated by apartheid White forces and 
Zulu elites sharing a common interest in avoiding the worst political outcome of permanent 
deprivation of power was supported by other events including the issue of “cultural 
weapons.”19 The largely manipulative nature of Zulu violence was also clearly shown, on the 
one hand, in the abrupt increase in violence when Inkatha denounced the final multi-party 
compromise concerning a new South African constitution and transition procedures and, on 
the other hand, in the sudden dramatic decrease in violence when Inkatha revoked its 
decision to boycott the first universal elections and announced its plan to participate in the 
elections. With the assistance of the White governing forces that had a shared interest in 
preventing their permanent exclusion from power, the politically threatened Zulu leadership 
largely manipulated its rank and file’s violence in order to increase its political bargaining 
power at the negotiations during the transition and obtain as many concessions from the 
ANC as possible.20 
 
4.3 The Political Benefits of Zulu Violence 
 
Buthelezi threatened to boycott elections and adopt an extreme option of “liberation war” 
                                                          
19 With regard to the issue of “cultural weapons,” see The Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs (1992: 70-72 and 103-104). 
20A similar point of view is found in Piper (2002). 
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unless significant concessions were made to accommodate his political demands including 
regional autonomy (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1994: 39894). The ANC provided 
significant political concessions, one after another, to Inkatha in order to prevent it from 
boycotting elections and continuing violent resistance. Without intensive expression of its 
political demands through fierce violence, Inkatha would not have obtained such significant 
political concessions from the ANC. After significant political concessions from the ANC, 
Buthelezi finally agreed to participate in elections, just a week before the start of elections. 
The concessions of benefit to the Inkatha Freedom Party were as follows: 
 
1. 3,000,000 hectares of state land, one-third of the Kwazulu province, was transferred to the 
control of King Goodwill Zwelithini, which left only 300,000 hectares of land in the hands of 
the state (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1994: 39992). 
2. Guarantees would be provided on the constitutional status of the Zulu monarchy and 
kingdom within Kwazulu-Natal (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1994: 39942). 
3. The powers of regional legislatures would be strengthened. Regional legislatures would have 
exclusive legislative functions in a wide range of policy areas from planning and 
development to casinos and gambling. In the areas of education, health and housing, regional 
legislatures would enjoy concurrent legislative competencies with national government 
(Keesing’s Record of World Events 1993: 39584). Each provincial legislature would be also 
entitled to write a constitution for the region, provided that it compiled with the principles 
governing the national constitution (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1993: 39723). 
4. A two-ballot system would be adopted. Separate ballot papers would be used for the election 
of national and regional representatives, rather than the single-ballot system approved at the 
multi-party constitutional negotiations in 1993 (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1993: 
39846). 
5. The province of Natal would be renamed to Kwazulu-Natal (Keesing’s Record of World 
Events 1993: 39846). Besides, Kwazulu and Natal would constitute a single constituency. 
This had a political effect of making the Zulu-dominant area the second largest constituency. 
According to the Interim Constitution, the provincial legislature of Natal-Kwazulu would 
have 80 seats, which was second only to that of PWV that accounted for 86 seats. The 
province of Natal-Kwazulu would also account for 40 of the 200 National Assembly seats 
from regional lists (Ruchti 1995: 196 and 200). 
6. Based on the pre-election polls showing that the IFP would obtain about 10 percent of the 
votes (Facts on File February 25, 1993: 109), at least one cabinet portfolio was expected to 
be assigned to the IFP. This was due to a constitutional provision that any party with at least 
5 percent of the votes would be entitled to a number of Cabinet portfolios proportionate to 
the number of seats it held (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1993: 39723). 
7. A 90-seat Senate would be newly established, with each of the nine newly drawn regions 
electing 10 senators (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1993: 38723). 
8. A 400-seat National Assembly would be elected by proportional representation, with 200 
seats from regional lists and 200 seats from the national list (Keesing’s Record of World 
Events 1993: 39723). 
 
As long as these institutional provisions helped to constrain simple and pure majority rule 
and reduce the risk of the IFP’s exclusion from power, it would be less likely to resort to 
violent methods in order to realize its political demands. In fact, one of the most striking 
features after the IFP reached the final decision to participate in the elections was the 
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comparative lack of violence. “Police reported on April 30 that the whole country, including 
Kwazulu-Natal and the Eastern Transvaal which had been racked by political conflict, had 





To provide some preliminary knowledge about the Zulus, the key ethnic group involved 
in political violence during the South African democratic transition, this study has begun 
with a brief introduction to who the Zulus are, with focus on their history and language. It 
has also discussed the features of Zulu nationalism, which helps to understand today’s Zulus 
and their politics better. Zulu nationalism is characterized by a strong consciousness of 
history, the idea of king as the nation, the seeking of political legitimacy from heredity, 
persistent traditionalism, and militancy. This study has also noted that the relatively late 
exposition of the Zulus to the modern economy and the underdevelopment of the Zulu area 
account for why a strong traditionalism is still prevalent among them inside and outside the 
Zulu homeland.  
This was followed by a new explanation for the origins of the Zulu violence in the early 
1990s. This study has attempted to provide a political explanation for the violence instead of 
the existing historical, economic or psychological explanations. It has argued that the 
primary sources of the Zulu violence during the period were the great risk of permanent 
exclusion of Zulu political elites from power after a post-apartheid transition to simple 
majority rule and the threatened Zulu elites’ manipulation of the economically destabilized 
masses for their own political benefits. In fact, as a result of the intensive resistance to the 
ANC program for post-transition politics, Zulu political elites succeeded in securing a lot of 
significant political concessions from the prospective post-transitional government party. 
Let us conclude by noting that even though this study has emphasized a political variable 
in the explanation for the Zulu violence in the early 1990s, it has not completely ignored the 
destabilized economic life of the masses as a source of the violence.  The poor economy was 
clearly responsible for the Zulu violence in the sense that it made the masses more vulnerable 
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21 This does not mean that in the wake of the democratic transition, bloody political violence had 
completely disappeared. Nonetheless, it is true that the nature of violence increasingly changed. 
Before the transition, Inkatha more or less succeeded in presenting the ANC and its allies as the 
enemy of the whole Zulu nation. Yet, after the transition, it became more and more difficult for 
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786; The Economist March 30, 1996: 43. Also see Piper (2002: 86). For post-1994 patterns of 
violence, see Benini (1998).  
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